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A Realistic Evaluation of Fines for Hospital 
Discharges: Incorporating the History of Programme 
Evaluations in the Analysis 
 
Manzano-Santaella, A 
 
Many programmes, especially those implemented over a considerable period 
and across many local institutions have the habit of self-transformation. They 
bend because of differences in local conditions, funding contingencies, 
political impetus, staff turnover, policy fashions and so on. Above all they 
change because from the start they meet with varying success. Unsuccessful 
programmes may continue to die a slow death or they may be revived and 
remodelled. Successes may remain successful, or they may over-reach 
themselves, or they may just become ‘part of the furniture’. Even more 
perplexing is the possibility that all of these transformations may occur 
simultaneously in different localities and institutions.  
 
This condition, which sociologists rather grandly term: ‘morphogenesis in 
adaptive systems’, can wreak havoc in evaluation research. Evaluation is 
always space and time limited, so that effectively the researcher is left to 
investigate part of the programme process in part of the institutional 
apparatus. From multisite and longitudinal evaluations to the incorporation of 
evaluators as an ongoing feature of programme design and implementation, 
the apprehension of the ‘programme reality’ is always limited. Furthermore, 
the ever-decreasing time-frame between the requirements of policy analysis 
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and policy development makes it common for evaluations to be undertaken 
before programmes have run their course. 
 
Viewed in this light, evaluations are always ‘case studies’. This paper 
considers how to incorporate some of the history of programme 
transformation into an evaluative case study in such a way that evidence from 
that study can speak for intervention more generally. To illustrate this process, 
an evaluation of the Community Care (Delayed Discharges etc.) Act 2003, an 
English policy designed to financially penalise social services for hospital 
delayed discharges (Department of Health, 2003a) is used as a vehicle for 
methodological exposition. This study performed a theory-driven evaluation, 
incorporating the realist logic to evaluate the effectiveness of this 
reimbursement policy, a prime example of the self-transformation of 
programmes that are designed nationally to be implemented locally.  
 
The article starts explaining what delayed discharges are and how they came 
to be a policy priority in the English National Health Service (NHS). The 
following section introduces the realist methodology and the evaluation 
presented in this article. Finally, the results are explained over two sections 
that follow the main components of realist evaluation analysis: context and 
outcome patterns (including mechanisms), focusing on how the history of 
programme evaluations was incorporated in the analysis process. This article 
aims to contribute to the development of the realist evaluation strategy by 
introducing programme’s transformations as key evidence when trying to 
understand how complex interventions work in particular contexts.  
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Realist Evaluation of Fines for Hospital Discharges: 
Background and Methodology 
 
The use of financial incentives to influence behaviour has been extensively 
analysed in the literature of multiple disciplines. Within health care, in the last 
decade, attention focused on the way in which incentives could improve 
efficiency in publicly funded health systems. In hospital care, financial 
incentives are a common management tool to reduce patients’ length of stay. 
The constant fight to confront all obstacles to early discharge theories made it 
only a matter of time before the generation of specific incentives for social 
services patients’ delays (phenomenon also referred with the loaded term 
‘bed-blocking’). In 2001, the English government expressed its intention to 
eliminate widespread bed-blocking with the allocation of a significant NHS and 
social care budget increase (Department of Health, 2001). This increase in 
funding was accompanied by the introduction of cross-charging to deal with 
bed-blocking inspired by previous experiences in Scandinavian countries 
(Department of Health, 2002). The Community Care (Delayed Discharges, 
etc.) Act 2003 was the first exclusive policy response to the problem of 
delayed discharges in the form of statutory law in England. It introduced, 
among other initiatives, financial penalties for local authority social services 
departments unable to discharge patients from hospitals within set timescales. 
Social services are given a minimum of two days to assess and arrange 
services. Then, once the hospital decides that the patient is ready to leave, 
social services are given 24 hours to organize the patient’s discharge. If the 
patient is not discharged on the third day, the local authority must pay the 
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hospital £100 per day (£120 in south-east England). The basic assumption is 
that local authorities would be prompted to assess and transfer patients 
quickly out of hospital because of the threat of fines. 
 
Fines appeared to reduce delays in three countries (Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark) where they were implemented in the 1990s. In England, since 
implementation of the programme, the number of delays dropped nationally 
and, moreover, they seem to do so rapidly (McCoy et al, 2007a). The 
association of all these factors is potentially pleasing to policy-makers but the 
causal relationship between all of them is not clear. Evaluations of this 
programme theory exist from the Scandinavian implementation but also from 
different English sites. All these evaluations are small pieces of the puzzle 
that the Delayed Discharges Act represents. Each of them explains how the 
programme works from different perspectives. Some offer simple outcome 
measures concentrating on volume and time periods of discharge to measure 
efficiency. Others, using a greater range of methods, examine some of the 
organisational changes that occurred after implementation. The evaluation 
reported in this article took place in one locality and it followed a small group 
of patients in detail but it presents a new onset from the previous ones. It tries 
to fill the gap for an evaluation that could explain how the financial incentives 
achieved the proposed changes. By concentrating more specifically on the 
role that the fines played in the successful outcomes and unintended 
consequences of the programme, certain features of the fines become more 
attainable.  
 
 5 
The empirical work was designed around unravelling the inner workings of the 
fines. Accepting that fines reduce delays, the question to answer is ‘how and 
why does it happen?’ To elucidate the internal dynamics of how programmes 
work, the main broad objectives of this research were: 
- To produce an analysis of the process and context in which financial 
incentives are applied. 
- To explore how the financial incentives reduce the number of delayed 
transfers of care. 
 
The combination of underlying programme mechanisms and contexts 
generate outcome patterns that help answer the question ‘why does the 
programme work in here?’ The main research question becomes ‘How do 
fines actually work to reduce delays?’ The organised efforts to intervene (with 
fines) for the purposes of solving a problem (delayed discharges) are 
assessed with these evaluative questions (Chen, 1990).  
 
Cultural, social, economic and organizational contexts influence how the 
patient group of the so-called ‘bedblockers’ could be defined. Nevertheless, 
there are rival conceptions and interpretations of this term which could thus be 
considered to come under the rubric of an ‘essentially contested 
concept’(Gallie, 1956). Bed-blocking is an internally complex term, open-
ended and based on qualitative notions. Interpretations of the concept are 
disputed with particular lines of thought being sustained by different 
standpoints. In brief, the presence of delays in a health system may be 
considered as an indicator of two possible system inefficiencies: a failure in 
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the discharge planning process, which generally blames social services for 
not ensuring timely services; or a shortage of alternative forms of care for this 
group of patients (Author, 2010). This situation poses several evaluation and 
methodological challenges. El Ansari et al. (2001) explain the complexity of 
evaluating multi-agent programmes since ‘its enquiries will exhibit similar 
features and will have different meanings for each and every participant 
group. Each constituency will want to ask different questions about whether, 
how and why it works’ (p.223). The challenge of this evaluation thus was to 
grasp the complexity of a multi-agency programme that deals with objectives 
for two organisations (acute hospitals and social services departments) which, 
although they may have the same long-term goals, in practice have very 
diverse immediate aims. Judge et al. (1999) note that traditional evaluation 
approaches could fail to reflect the complexities of collaborative government, 
arguing instead for the adoption of methodologies based on models of 
‘realistic evaluation’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) and ‘theories of change‘ 
(Connell et al., 1995). 
 
In the area of policy evaluation, Pawson and Tilley have developed a set of 
methodological principles to evaluate programmes following the realist 
strategy to research. These principles are based on the ‘theory-driven’ (Chen, 
1990) or ‘theory based’ (Weiss, 1997) approaches but rooted in the tradition 
of scientific realism, concerning the nature and operation of causal forces in 
the social world. These are assessed through configurations of contexts, 
mechanisms and outcomes. The real (mechanisms), the causal (events which 
may or may not be observable) and the empirical (evidence of experiences 
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and observable events) are elicited with the objective of describing the 
relationship, if any, between them. The use of a realist research strategy 
seeks to unravel most of the complex relationships between national and local 
policy contexts and the organisational dynamics that characterise multi-
agency initiatives.  
 
The use of a case study approach helped unravel the complexities of this 
multi-agency initiative. Discharges of fourteen patients were followed in one 
hospital site in the North of England so as to identify flows and blockages in 
the programme. Multiple methods of data collection were performed in real-
time, meaning that discharge planning activities were followed as they 
occurred, observing them and then asking the actors to comment on them. 73 
participant observations, 39 qualitative interviews and documentary analysis 
constituted the main techniques used to capture programme implementation. 
For delayed discharges policy, an advantage of the case study approach is 
their ability to accommodate complex causal relations inherent to partnership 
programmes (Gray et al., 2003). Statistical sampling was discarded because 
a probabilistic sample could never be representative of the larger population 
of programme participants. The main reasons being that this policy only 
applies to a relatively small number of patients with ‘unmet’ social needs 
(McCoy et al., 2007a) and the complexity and interpretation of such a 
definition would make the probabilistic sampling impossible. In other words, 
random sampling could never identify the variation of programme participants 
because the intervention has unexpected processes that cannot be predicted 
a priori for statistical purposes. 
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The use of non-probability purposive sampling permits the selection of case 
studies based on the judgement about the extent to which they represent a 
population or a significant group of people (Blaikie, 2000). Cases were 
discussed with ward managers, discharge liaison officers and social services 
staff to make sure they would ‘maximize variability so as to discover whether 
the program succeeds across a whole spectrum of sites’ (Weiss, 1998: 164). 
In addition, general criteria for participant inclusion mirrored those set out in 
the Community Care (Delayed Discharges etc.) Act 2003. These are: 
- Patients receiving acute care. 
- Over 18 years of age. 
- Referral to social services was formally issued  
 
Of the 39 interviews, 13 were with patients, 12 with hospital staff and 14 with 
social services staff. The formal participant observations were divided in two 
settings: 37 multidisciplinary team meetings and 36 management meetings. 
Interview transcripts were transcribed verbatim and observations and other 
activities were also transcribed with added reflexive comments, which were an 
initial ‘on site’ attempt to codify data as possible mechanisms, context and 
outcomes.  
 
Exploring Context: Born in the Nordic Countries, Borrowed in 
England 
 
Programmes metamorphose. An idea is born, and then undergoes a series of 
changes in its form, sometimes small sometimes abrupt. Transformations 
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occur when programmes are transferred across different physical and 
temporal environments. In the case of the fines for delayed hospital 
discharges, the history of programme’s transformation starts in the 
Scandinavian countries, it evolves in Whitehall corridors, and it changes again 
when it is implemented in excess of a hundred English local authorities with 
social services responsibilities and NHS hospitals with acute beds. 
 
In the 1990’s, three Nordic countries were pioneers in introducing 
programmes that enforced local authorities to pay a fee for patients in hospital 
who had finished their treatment but remained in there due to their social 
needs: Denmark (Colmorten et al., 2004), Sweden (Styrborn and Thorslund, 
1993) and Norway (Health Committee, 2004). In all these three countries, the 
reimbursement reforms were deemed broadly successful by policy analysts. A 
sharp reduction of delayed discharges, bed closures and lower average 
length of stays were reported as the main outcomes of success. 
Nevertheless, accounts were not always positive. All three reforms were 
accompanied by reports of decreasing quality of care (Twaddle, 1999; 
Colmorten et al., 2004; Harrison, 2004) and the reimbursement schemes were 
assessed as ‘unduly expensive in the long run’ (Fotaki and Boyd, 2005: 239). 
These early Scandinavian experiences were claimed as a form of 
legitimisation by the British Government: fines worked in Sweden and 
Denmark and that was why the system was brought into England. This 
reimbursement scheme was fully implemented in 2004 and is still operational 
at the time of writing.  
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If you enter the social world’s DNA, the inexorable transformation of this 
simple idea occurs. All programmes are implemented in the social world and 
this is a complex entity in constant flux. Rogers (2008) explained that complex 
problems tend to be those developed through networks and partnership 
governance. In the case of delayed transfers of care, the issue resides on the 
borders of both health and social systems. The Delayed Discharges Act is a 
policy solution based on partnership governance that confronts the challenge 
of a multi-faceted and multi-agency topic, including multiple factors outside 
the control of social services (Glasby et al., 2004). Shifting power relations, 
uneven capacities and political opportunities need to be taken into account 
when addressing how delayed discharges theories are shaped. For example, 
the successful discharge of patients in the community depends as much on 
the prompt availability of resources like publicly funded housing facilities or 
care homes, as on the inter-agency discharge planning procedures to 
manage the micro-characteristics of individual patients.  
 
Another important factor to consider is that other programmes implemented 
simultaneously to the reimbursement scheme could have equal impact for 
acute patients. Although programmes are addressed to specific institutions, in 
real life they interact, overlap and intermix with some of the other institutional 
players. For instance, one initiative that directly interacted with the financial 
incentives programme theory is the English National Guidance on Choice 
Directive (Department of Health, 2007). This directive establishes the right for 
patients to select a care establishment of their choice. These two polices 
come into conflict when patients need to be admitted into care from hospital 
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beds. Their preferred establishment most probably will not have an instantly 
available vacancy, with the most popular homes having long waiting lists and, 
subsequently, delays occur.  
 
Not only innovations outside the programme but those within the programme 
are as significant for the development of the theories of change implemented. 
The Delayed Discharges Act brought about multiple innovations, besides the 
fines, which cannot be artificially divided for the purposes of evaluation 
(Author, 2009). Financial incentives are never introduced in isolation. They are 
accompanied by a multitude of initiatives that can have as much power to 
change old practices. In addition to the cash injection applied to the health 
and social care systems, other designed organisational changes were 
introduced also aimed at reducing patients’ length of stay, transforming 
discharge practices and improving quality of decision-making and care. All 
these innovations are interrelated and to evaluate one is to evaluate all of 
them. They have similar objectives and they generate similar outcomes. To 
untangle the intricate links that unite all of them is not only a difficult task, but 
most possibly an unattainable one. 
 
Hospitals do not work in isolation. Many different organisations besides social 
services departments, such as primary care trusts, independent and voluntary 
sector providers need to work in cooperation with acute hospitals to reduce 
delayed discharges. The contextual characteristics of individuals, institutional 
relationships and settings, and the wider macro-structural system will shape 
how fines work in each locality. Like in chameleons, programme 
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metamorphoses occur as self-defence mechanisms. Programme theory has 
an ability to blend in with its new surroundings as a form of survival. In the 
case of the Delayed Discharges Act, when the programme was first 
announced, the local health and social care managers met to re-define the 
nationally defined theories into local practices that were the most convenient 
for their services. In other words, the theories of change proposed by the 
national organisation (Department of Health) were organised locally by middle 
managers. Local implementation of national programmes involves adapting 
these to local circumstances. Consequently, when evaluating a programme 
locally, we have to draw a picture that captures ‘the unique diversities and 
contrasts that mark local programs and to understand how and why programs 
deviate from initial plans and expectations’ (Patton, 1987: 28). The importance 
of local circumstances in determining how barriers or facilitators of change 
operate in any setting should not be overseen and Figure 1 illustrates this.  
 
[Figure 1 to be located here] 
 
This figure includes a sample of the multiple levels of the nature of the 
Delayed Discharges programme identified in this evaluation. They are 
symbolised as different interconnected layers of the social reality of the 
programme where the multiple aspects affecting discharge processes and 
fines rest. The discharge options available are subordinate to the relationship 
between all the institutions involved. These levels are represented in Figure 1 
as layers which resemble Layder’s (1993) stratified model of society and they 
have numerous components and the relationships between all of these 
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intertwine. Components can interact within the same level but they can also 
interfere with components within other levels. For example, when evaluating 
the role of financial incentives, the link between these and the performance 
indicators (see meso-social phenomena layer in Figure 1) on which health 
and social care organisations were routinely assessed at the time of the 
fieldwork needed to be explored.  
 
The theory of linking financial incentives to performance indicators builds on 
the economic theory of ‘change the financial reward and the behaviour will be 
changed’ (Fetter et al., 1976). Although ‘delayed discharges’ is a performance 
indicator managed by financial incentives, it is also embedded in a group of 
other performance indicators which are managed by another tool for target 
compliance: public reporting. In addition, fragmentation occurs between health 
and social care organisations themselves with different audit bodies and 
assessment tools for each agency. Data gathering for regulatory purposes is 
collected, managed and analysed by different institutions, which can 
potentially increase the recognised problems with data quality in healthcare 
regulation (Attride-Stirling et al., 2006).  
 
In summary, there is a complexity within the performance indicators which 
shapes and potentially disguises the attribution of causality with regard to 
fines. The situation described above exemplifies some of the difficulties when 
evaluating the impact of one single measure like the fines. Figure 1 illustrates, 
however, how the whole programme depends on nested territorial levels of 
decision-making which become more complicated in the context of complex 
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overlapping networks. Consequently, the difficulty of evaluating this 
programme remained in the detailed interaction between the various agencies 
and the identification of the connections and outcomes of individual actors 
which are embedded in their own institutional, historical and political 
specificities. Not only because of the complexity that they represent but, most 
significant for this article, for the opportunities for self-transformation that 
every interaction offers.  
 
Of course, this figure does not contain every single element that could affect 
hospital delayed discharges. Cilliers (2000) argues that any ‘perfect’ 
representation of complex systems must be as complex as the system itself, 
and this is an impossible task. In building representations of such ‘open 
systems’, we are forced to leave things out, and since the effects of these 
omissions are nonlinear, we cannot predict their magnitude. In other words, 
solutions to these problems would always be imperfect, and imperfection is 
also inevitable in their evaluations. In this study, priority was given to the 
aspects that interact more closely with the discharge planning processes that 
the fines try to modify in one particular context: one site (one acute hospital), 
one temporal section (2006-2007) and the elements that took special 
relevance in the discharge processes of fourteen patients. Therefore, if 
programmes are so defined by the context in which they are implemented, 
how can we learn transferable lessons from their contextualised evaluations? 
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Developing Mechanisms and Outcome Patterns in a Self-
Transforming Programme 
 
Programmes transform inexorably but mostly, quietly from their original 
design. Programmes change silently because previous similar interventions 
are frequently used as justification of why they will work. Modifications are, 
generally, overseen as contextually necessary or as improvements from 
original designs. In other words, changes in programme theory are considered 
(by both implementers and evaluators) only as necessary adaptations to the 
contextual differences of the sites where they are applied and not as key 
modifications that may affect the expected outcomes. It is not infrequent to 
picture programme theory as a shielded block of ideas that is created 
somewhere and later on transported, intact, from programme designers, to 
implementers and from these, once again, to programme practitioners. 
However, Bickman (1987: 6) explains how  
 
‘often the objectives, goals, and theory underlying the program may be 
purposely ambiguous because of political concerns; that is, it may be kept 
intentionally vague in order to gain support from different groups’.  
 
Consequently, programmes could have their theory explicitly described and, 
at the same time, ambiguously not described, leaving enough room for new 
theory generation. This view leads to the notion of a modifiable programme 
theory, which needs to be tracked down at different physical and temporal 
locations in the life of a programme.  
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In the case of the Delayed Discharges programme, it was tested in the 90s in 
three Scandinavian countries and then in England in the early 2000’s over 
164 acute trusts and their correspondent social services departments. 
Therefore, each of those locally transformed programme theories are testing 
exercises from which lessons are learned. Each of the site evaluations are 
sources of information that also need to be considered. This study, located in 
only one acute trust and with data from only fourteen cases confronted the 
challenge to establish generalisation from a small number of case studies 
while evaluating a complex programme. It cannot, however, be considered a 
‘one-off’ project because it is built from learning about previous studies. The 
present evaluation was not marooned in singular description because it used 
the knowledge gained from all the other studies. Consequently, the findings 
from this local implementation will state something about the broad 
programme theory (‘fines work to reduce delayed discharges’) as a general 
theory of change, thus, a number of transferable lessons can be learned from 
everybody and for everybody.  
 
All the evaluations of the Community Care (Delayed Discharges etc.) Act 
2003 published at the time of writing were taken into consideration in the 
analysis. Some of these were ‘quantitative accounts’ provided by the 
Department of Health, based on internal audits which showed a significant 
reduction in delayed discharges since the implementation of the programme. 
(Department of Health, 2004; Secretary of State for Health, 2006; Brindle, 
2007). The Commission for Social Care Inspection (2004) performed two 
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evaluations on the effects of the reimbursement programme. The first 
evaluation looked at the initial months of implementation in seven local 
authorities, examining 151 case records and interviewing 70 people a few 
weeks after their discharge. Their second report (Commission for Social Care 
Inspection, 2005) was a follow-up exercise a year later in which they re-
interviewed the same people as in 2004.  
 
The UK Economic and Social Research Council funded an evaluation of the 
reimbursement programme based on the use of mixed-methods: a survey of 
all social services departments to determine level of reimbursement; analysis 
of weekly monitoring data on delayed discharges, and Hospital Episode 
Statistics data; and a qualitative case study in two London Boroughs 
interviewing key stakeholders (Godden et al., 2007; McCoy et al., 2007a, 
McCoy et al., 2007b; McCoy et al., 2007c). Before the announcement of the 
reimbursement programme, the Department of Health commissioned a study 
(Baumann et al., 2007) intending to fill the evidence gap regarding solutions to 
delays. This research analysed sites performing ‘exceptionally well’ with 
regards delayed discharges and it drew general knowledge from their 
practices. Six ‘high performing’ sites were selected, using a statistical model 
to shortlist authorities. Interviews were held with health and social services 
staff to identify key features of their sites. Based on organisational changes 
and outcomes, this study did not specifically concentrate on the innovations 
brought about by the reimbursement programme. It did, however, include 
characteristics of the local areas and examined existing local organisational 
arrangements.  
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Another study commissioned by the Department of Health was a longitudinal 
multi-site project carried out in three hospitals in England and two hospitals in 
Scotland (Godfrey et al., 2008). Two different approaches to tackling delayed 
discharges are compared in this research: the English reimbursement scheme 
and the Scottish Joint Action Planning adopted in 2002. Using a multi-method 
approach, researchers examined documents, observed meetings and 
practices and interviewed stakeholders, staff and service users and their 
carers. The contextual delimitations of discharge practices make comparative 
research of this type a difficult task. This study, however, incorporated views 
of frail elderly patients about their discharges and it also offered a 
comprehensive analysis of some of the innovations beside the fines brought 
in by the programme. Nevertheless, the authors expressed their difficulty in 
drawing ‘any clear conclusions about the role played by the ‘stick’ of 
reimbursement i.e. fines imposed on the local authority for reimbursable 
delays’ (Godfrey et al., 2008: 39). 
 
Some of these evaluations were able to evaluate the theory in a variety of 
sites (spaces) or longitudinally (times) (See Figure 2). Others, like this one, 
can only reach a small amount of data in a specific location but it stills feeds 
from all the others evaluation schemes. 
 
[Figure 2 to be located here] 
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Figure 2 was created to explain how this process of data accumulation 
occurs. It is mapped on two axes; these represent the coordinates ‘time’ and 
‘space’ in which measurement in the form of evaluations or institutional audits 
(in grey rectangles) occur across diverse locations and at different times of 
programme implementation (in grey circles). The question here is how can all 
these previous enquiries be accommodated and brought to bear on the case 
under investigation; how can they be ‘banked’ to render the single study more 
generalisable? The answer is that the analytic strategy intends to work 
through programme complexity examining current and past data at different 
levels. Surfacing the local design of the programme theory is a first step that 
builds from the literature review on the problem (delayed discharges) and 
attempts to solve it; while performing at the same time, a detailed examination 
of the national policy, which included all available evaluations of the core 
programme theory. The assessment of the contextual framework of the 
research site informs the analysis of the structures influencing the programme 
and this helps the interpretation of the mechanisms used locally to avoid the 
fines. Then, these are compared with other similar mechanisms used 
elsewhere. Afterwards, secondary readjustments to all these working 
hypotheses are made to finally abstract some middle range propositions 
applicable to any future implementations of the same programme theory. This 
logic of analysis draws on the same methodological process of realist 
synthesis, attempting to explore the ‘process of thinking through the tortuous 
pathways along which a successful intervention has to travel’ (Pawson, 
2006a: 170). In empirical work, however, “digging for nuggets” of knowledge 
as Pawson suggests (2006b:134) is not a prior fieldwork systematic search for 
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theories in the literature. It is a process embedded before, during and after the 
collection of new data in which historical fragments of evidence from other 
sites inform the construction of context, mechanisms and outcomes. 
 
Strategies designed nationally are only ‘suggestions’ that can or cannot be 
followed when the programme is implemented in specific locations (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997).  Although the implementation evaluated here has unique 
local circumstances, this will be the case in any other location. The task 
embarked on is to explore how different contextual challenges enhance or 
weaken the basic programme theory. Assuming that fines work to reduce 
delayed discharges in some settings and not in others, to understand the 
behavioural patterns of the fines, the analysis strategy focused on contextual 
constraints of the programme mechanisms. The banking of the data extracted 
from contextual circumstances is illustrated in Figure 3, using the example of 
some of the key findings of this project.  
 
[Figure 3 to be located here] 
 
In the same way that realist synthesis reviews the same theory in comparative 
settings, (Pawson et al., 2005) previous evaluations were considered valuable 
sources of information and were inspected to develop the analysis. Evidential 
fragments of their findings were considered unit of analysis to be utilised 
within the logic of analysis. Then, they were interrogated to establish whether 
theories were confirmed, contradicted or modified. For example, in this 
evaluation, there was a case study with a long delayed discharge that the 
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fines could not resolve. Explanations for this ‘blockage’ were looked for in the 
contextual circumstances of the research site but also in those of the other 
evaluations. This case study, which experienced the longest delay in the 
sample had a significant micro-contextual characteristic. The patient was a 
young man who needed re-housing in a council property to be able to leave 
the hospital after a stroke. Subsequently, references to public housing 
structures were searched in all the research sites that have ever used fines to 
improve delayed discharges. 
 
High property prices and lack of affordable and council housing are 
characteristics of the research site. This shortage of council housing and the 
limited involvement of the local housing department in the development of fast 
services for hospital patients framed the emergence of a key contextual 
feature of these implementations (which it was named Context ‘housing 
needs’). The reimbursement programme was addressed to social services 
departments in local authorities which in England are totally independent from 
housing units. Compartmentalisation trends in public services divided these 
two institutions; they have different budgets and objectives and lack tradition 
in working together with regards hospital discharge. Prompt access to 
adequate housing was a national difficulty identified before programme 
implementation and the above cultural and organisational divides between 
housing departments, social services and the NHS were recognised by the 
Department of Health as limiting effective joint working for fast discharges. 
Besides, the need to secure a variety of housing options for discharging 
patients in many localities would have meant a significant increase in the 
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stock of affordable, supportive housing. The difficulties with these matters 
arrived back to the policy designers as they expressed in a later guidance 
(Department of Health, 2003b), when they accepted that social services 
departments could not take responsibility for these delays and excluded 
housing needs from reimbursement. 
 
As a result of the above contextual circumstances, the likelihood of the young 
man of this case study being allocated a suitable council property within a few 
days was much reduced. Critically, when other implementations were 
explored for this contextual characteristic, the Swedish fine scheme was 
accompanied by the increase of the housing alternatives available and the 
improvement of the quality housing facilities for older and disabled people 
(Minford, 2001). This bit of programme theory was considered key evidence in 
the consolidation of ‘housing’ as a key contextual circumstance that could 
enhance or disable the changing power of the fines. In Figure 3 this is 
represented with a long grey block arrow that connects both findings. 
Because housing needs were excluded from the reimbursement programme, 
after implementation, in this research site hospital staff tended to be left on 
their own to deal with patients who needed re-housing, a role that social 
services used to take before the reimbursement policy. Hospital staff lacked 
knowledge of the procedures, contacts in the housing department and 
dedicated professionals to deal with patients with this type of needs and the 
likelihood of delays increased. Additionally, this finding speaks more generally 
for incentives theory and it identifies a well documented unintended 
consequence of financial incentives: ‘Goal displacement’. This phenomenon 
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has been defined in the sociology of organisations for more than half a 
century, which recognises that the incentivisation of performance is likely to 
lead to decrease performance outside the domain incentivised. This has also 
been referred to as ‘synecdoche’ (Bevan and Hood, 2005); ‘hitting the target 
but missing the point’, ‘tunnel vision’ (Smith, 1993), ‘parochialism’ (Jacobs and 
Manzi, 2000); or ‘what’s measured is what matters’ (Marshall et al., 2000).  
 
In Figure 3, another important finding was itemised. Since the number of 
delayed discharges was significantly reduced following the implementation of 
the programme, it was assumed that mechanisms (whether planned or 
unplanned) followed and these generated the sharp reduction in the number 
of delays observed in quantitative data collections. As an initial exercise, the 
way in which delays were counted before and after programme 
implementation was explored. The introduction of the reimbursement 
programme was accompanied by a compulsory weekly census to count 
delays. The policy designers considered that rigorous management 
information systems would be necessary to make the reimbursement system 
work. Quantitative performance data which relate to hospital delays have to 
be collected daily by the acute hospital and then sent off weekly to the 
Department of Health. Therefore, a weekly census to count delays was 
enforced, as opposed to the one day quarterly census system used in the 
past. For many years, data for hospital delays was collected every three 
months using a ‘one-day’ census of hospital bed use.  
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Interestingly, the Swedish evidence that highlighted the success of the fines 
was collected using a monitoring system based on one day annual census. 
This annual collection is also used in Scotland but has been deemed more 
vulnerable to gaming activities with agencies trying to fast discharge patients 
in the weeks immediately prior to the one day of monitoring (Godfrey et al., 
2008). In summary, the frequency of data monitoring is a mechanism that 
reduces delays. If social services are warned of a specific day (annually or 
every quarter) when nationally all patients waiting in hospital for social care 
are counted, then efforts to move patients concentrate on emptying hospitals 
on that day (Swedish and Scottish system). However, if patients are counted 
weekly a clearer picture of the problem will follow. The locality evaluated in 
this evaluation, like others around the country, as a consequence of this close 
monitoring, established a weekly management meeting, including hospital and 
social services senior staff, to discuss delays and fines before data are sent to 
the Department of Health. This type of interagency meetings is associated 
with hospital sites that have low figures of delayed discharges (Baumann et 
al., 2007). In parallel, in this research site local social services managers 
constituted another weekly meeting with the objective of accelerating funding 
decisions, when reimbursement was implemented.  
 
A similar type of weekly funding allocation meeting is present in all three sites 
in the Godfrey et al. (2008) study. In those hospitals, like in the one analysed 
in this evaluation, the system for allocating the funding of the packages of 
care is rapid, with decisions made normally within a week. This mechanism 
seems to decrease the amount of delays caused by social services due to 
 25 
waiting for their funding. Godden et al. (2007) concluded that waiting for 
funding scored as the smallest percentage of patients delayed because of 
social services reasons. This is significant because waiting for social services 
funding is one of the common reasons for delayed discharges identified in the 
research literature. Consequently, weekly allocation panels to speed up 
funding decisions appear to cause a reduction in delays because they 
formalise weekly systems to approve funding, which did not exist before the 
implementation of the fines, and consequently, the close and structured joint 
monitoring of delays by both agencies is a mechanism that reduced delays. 
Middle managers (as opposed to social workers) with their weekly 
involvement in meetings took formal control not only of the fines but of the 
discharges in an unprecedented way. In Figure 3, these pieces of evidence 
are presented in the form of a ladder of evidence, linked by small blocked 
grey arrows that end in the findings of this evaluation.  
 
All the above information informed the development of a mechanism to 
reduce delays that was secondary to the introduction of the fines which was 
called ‘frequency of data monitoring’. The thread of fines generated several 
inter and intra-agency meetings that themselves (and not the fines) reduced 
delays. Since number of delays are now linked to fines, they are monitored 
and bargained daily. Social services managers are not only proactive in 
activating services for hospital patients but they also have a say in what 
patients are recorded as delays in the quantitative returns sent to the 
Department of Health. Instantly, the establishment of rigorous information 
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systems contributes to the numerical reduction of delayed discharges 
accounts.  
 
In summary, the preliminary theory (fines reduce delays) was refined and a 
new theory on how fines operated was developed. This identified other 
mechanisms contemporaneous to the fines which are more or as likely to 
reduce delays. Some of these are summarised in Table 1 and further 
explained in Author, 2009. 
 
[Table 1 to be located here] 
Conclusion 
 
The history of programmes’ transformations is formed by a sequenced of 
opportunities for programmes to morph. Attempts to evaluate patterns of 
cause and effect in programme’s theories should analyse those opportunities 
and identify them as part of the evaluation process. In this study, the 
application of a realist evaluation strategy provides the explanatory depth that 
such a complex multi-agency programme requires. This is highly relevant 
when evaluating policies that are designed nationally to be implemented 
locally and therefore, self-transforming inexorably. Since the influence of 
contextual factors needs to be taken into account because the same measure 
(in this evaluation, the fines) is never an exact replica and consequently, the 
same effect will not be produced.  
 
 27 
The concept of policy context is central to this evaluation. It refers to the 
historical, political and legal settings, organisational structure, the character of 
markets, and the nature of issues related to the topic where programmes are 
implemented. Following the hypothesis that the nature of the issue to improve 
(delayed discharges in this case) and the institutional context largely 
determine the ways in which particular policy instruments evolve and, 
therefore operate. If that is the case, methods to evaluate these programmes 
should reflect those contextual differences. They should also be able to 
identify the elements of the ‘programme amalgam’ before claiming causality.  
 
The evaluation used in this article as a vehicle for methodological explanation 
presented a new onset from the previous ones. It tried to fill the gap for an 
evaluation that could explain how the financial incentives achieved the 
proposed changes. By concentrating more specifically on the role that the 
fines played in the successful outcomes and unintended consequences of the 
programme, certain features of the fines become more attainable. But they did 
so with the contribution of all the other evaluations of the same programme to 
developing understanding on how fines work. The tendency of traditional 
evaluations to be ‘rather self-contained assessments that do not build on 
learning from other disciplines or policy domains’ (Blamey and Mackenzie, 
2007: 448) is overcome with this approach. The evaluator builds on what 
other evaluators / researchers have already discovered about that same 
intervention. 
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In this evaluation, previous studies were inspected for evidence according to 
‘how it supports, weakens, modifies, supplements, reinterprets or refocuses’ 
(Pawson, 2006a: 96) not only the preliminary theory (fines reduce delays) but 
also my own theory on how fines operated (other mechanisms 
contemporaneous to the fines reduce delays). Causal relationships were 
investigated to ascertain whether they could hold and which were the contexts 
that facilitated or prevented their association. These could be institutional (like 
the example of the generation of inter and intra-institutional meetings); 
individual contexts or those derived from the macrostructure where the 
programme is embedded (like the example of the public housing infrastructure 
explained above). All of these were ‘cumulated’ together and contrasted with 
contexts learned from other implementations of the same programme theory. 
This was the way of aggregating knowledge: moving from one specific case to 
general theories, back to the next case and once again to review the theories. 
 
Social interventions are complex systems and they do not produce exact 
copycat programmes or copycat CMOs. When diverse research studies are 
brought into the analysis, concentrating on one programme theory but 
extracting evidence in the form of context-mechanism-outcomes, these will 
not materialize as duplicates that can be accumulated by easily pooling them 
together. The logic of this configurational puzzle uses aggregation and 
combination of the components, but also allows for emergence and for 
‘morphogenesis’ (Archer, 1998).   
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